Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Implications for India by Trivedi, Neeraj















Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in September-November 2020, was 
followed keenly by military strategists across the world. It was the first 
time a nation had been comprehensively defeated by the use of drone 
warfare. The changing nature of warfare and use of disruptive 
emerging technologies to change the tide of battle was an issue of interest 
across the world. Employment of drones on the battlefield of Nagorno-
Karabakh had been a game changer for Azerbaijani forces which 
destroyed the Armenian air defence (AD) resources, mech columns and 
arty guns. The low-cost option of employment of drones by Azerbaijan 
in a non-contact yet highly kinetic warfare resulted in minimizing 
of their own casualties and ensuring a crushing defeat for Armenia. 
As India embarks on the modernisation of its Armed Forces in line 
with its growing stature on the world stage, there has to be a balance 
struck between the acquisition of conventional weapon platforms and 
the embracement of new emerging technologies in India’s strategic 
security calculus. There is a need for building of anti-access bubbles as 
deterrence which are difficult to penetrate and use of technologies which 
provide leverage in this competitive space. 
Introduction 
The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict will go down in the annals of history as 
the first conflict in which drones deployed by one side turned the tide in the 
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44 days war. Military strategists around the world closely watched this conflict 
to study its ramifications on the future of battlespace. It ended in a humiliating 
defeat for Armenia and has important lessons for the military planners. The 
changing character of warfare and use of disruptive technologies to change 
the course of battle has been an issue of interest across the world. Employment 
of drones by Azerbaijan on the battlefield of Nagorno-Karabakh has been a 
game-changer and brought a shift in the dynamics of warfare.1
Emerging technologies have always brought changes to the character 
of warfare. For instance, when Babar used gunpowder it made the use 
of elephants lose their significance. Each War gets characterised by some 
innovation whether in tactics or by use of some disruptive technology. 
World War I witnessed the emergence of trench warfare and World War 
II saw the use of Mech forces in the blitzkrieg operations. In the last two 
year plus there have been many incidents of use of drones in warfare such 
as the attack on the Aramco oilfields by Houthi rebels, assassination of 
Soleimani, Operation Spring Shield launched by Turkey in Syria and the 
conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
In this perspective, the article seeks to assess the use of drones in 
changing the character of warfare in  21st century. In doing so, the study 
will examine the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on lessons 
drawn and assess the factors that shaped the fate of the conflict. It will 
also assess implications for India and draw suitable recommendations.
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Historical Underpinning
The Caucasus mountains are the continental divide between Asia and 
Europe. They stretch between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. This 
region is very rich in oil and minerals. The Caspian Sea has huge reserves 
of oil and the Baku-Tiblis-Ceyan (BTC) pipeline is vital for crude oil 
supply to Central Europe and a major source of revenue for Azerbaijan, 
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Georgia and Turkey. Armenia, Azerbaijan along with Georgia are part 
of the Caucasian countries. Because of the strategic and geographical 
significance of the Caucasian region the major stakeholders Iran, Russia 
and Turkey try to dominate the geopolitics of this region and hence the 
powerplay. 
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were part of the erstwhile Soviet 
Union when it was formed in the 1920s. Armenia is a landlocked 
country with Georgia to its North, Turkey to its West, Azerbaijan 
to its East and Iran to its South. Eighty-five per cent of the terrain 
is mountainous with fast-flowing rivers. The economy is primarily 
dependent on industrial output and minerals. It is a landlocked country 
with an average elevation which is the tenth highest in the world. Its 
capital is Yerevan and Prime Minister is Nicole Pashinyan who came to 
power in 2018, in what he describes as his Velvet Revolution. This was 
different from the other coloured revolutions as there was no foreign 
interference and it was a movement fuelled by domestic issues. The 
majority of the Armenian population is of ethnic origin (98 per cent) 
who follow Christianity. It is an ancient country and one of the oldest 
cradles of civilisation. 
Azerbaijan on the other hand has a majority of Muslim Shia 
population with 97 per cent of them being of Turkish origin. Azerbaijan 
has an area of 87,000 sq km and it’s capital is Baku. The terrain has 
Caucasus mountains to its North-East, flatlands in the centre and Caspian 
Sea on its Eastern coast. It has high economic development, a fall out of 
the new found petro-dollars  coupled with a high literacy rate. Its head 
of state is President Ilham Aliyev, who has been in power since 2003 and 
is a strong authoritarian leader. Azerbaijan, when it gained independence 
was split into two parts. The part separated from the mainland is called 
the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, a case similar to that of erstwhile 
East and West Pakistan, in the Indian sub-continent.













Nagorno-Karabakh is an autonomous region, having a majority of 
ethnic Armenian population of Christian faith and therefore is backed 
by Armenia who regards it as an integral part of their country. It has 
important towns of Stephenkart which is its capital and another town 
of Shusha which has Azeri population. There is a Lachin corridor 
which has strategic importance as this corridor connects it with 
Armenia. The name Nagorno-Karabakh itself implies Black Mountains 
but the Armenians prefer to call it as Artsakh. It has a population of 
1.5 lakh and an area of 44,000 sq km. This region has internationally 
been recognised as part of Azerbaijan, since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. This area has been the bone of contention between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and a cause of many conflicts. Nagorno-
Karabakh parliament had voted for unification with Armenia in 1988. 
This was unpalatable to Azerbaijan which always considered this 
region as an integral part of their territory. It led to guerrilla warfare, 
and unrest in the region. A referendum was conducted in 1991 at 
Nagorno-Karabakh, which was boycotted by the Azeri Muslims living 
in the region. It declared itself as an independent republic although 
this wasn’t recognized by any of the UN-led nations. In the early 
1990s, a war erupted between the two nations which resulted in an 
Armenian victory backed by Russian military. Armenia gained control 
of around 20 per cen  of Azerbaijani territories (7 districts surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh region). It became an emotive issue between both 
the countries and led to an escalation in arms race along with a low 
intensity conflict. There was a four-day war in the year 2016 and the 
skirmishes have left 30,000 persons dead with more than 100 million 
people displaced on both sides of the border.2
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Figure 1: Map depicting Area of control after the conflict of 1990s
Source: Adapted from TRT World.3
Geo-politics and Important Stakeholders to the Conflict
Different nations have sided with the two sides based on their own national 
strategic interests. The geostrategic importance of this region, rich in oil and 
minerals has resulted in a power play by various stakeholders trying to increase 
their spheres of influence and a power struggle to control it. Armenia gained 
the support of Russia as well as Iran, which itself is a Shia Muslim country 
and backed a Christian majority state. There are many reasons attributed to 
good relations between Armenia and Iran, such as: historical ties having been 
part of the earlier Mesopotamian Empire, and also as major trade partners. 
Russia too has been a cementing factor building relations between Armenia 
and Iran. Iran also has a population of around 20 million Azeri Turks who 
have been influenced by the rising Turkish nationalism and raised demands 
of Greater Azerbaijan including territories of Northern Iran. Therefore, Iran 
readily supports Armenia as a counterweight against Azerbaijan. The close 
ties of Azerbaijan with Israel, a sworn enemy of Iran, also makes it side with 
Armenia as a natural partner. Iran through its partnership with Armenia, also 
wants to balance out the growing nexus between Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
Russia, on the other hand, has a strategic alliance of CSTO (Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation) with Armenia and has  its 102 Russian Military 
Base stationed at Gyumri, in Armenia.4












Azerbaijan enjoys the support of all Muslim nations, especially 
Turkey as its staunch ally. Turkey and Azerbaijan share deep-rooted 
historic, cultural and ethnic ties. It has been described as one nation 
and two states by the erstwhile President and father of the incumbent 
President Ilham Aliyav. The international organisations striving to bring 
a resolution between the two warring nations are the UN and the OSCE 
(Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe) also called the 
Minsk Group. All other global powers have been giving a clarion call for 
a ceasefire and an amicable resolution.5
Course of the Conflict
With the newfound petro-dollars economy, Azerbaijan went in for a 
systematic modernisation of its armed forces. Armenia, on the other 
hand, has been dependent on vintage Russian defence equipment , while 
Azerbaijan has been on a buying spree of latest arms and equipment. 
Azerbaijan has a defence budget which is as high as 5.4 per cent of its 
GDP while Armenia has a modest outlay of 1.5 per cent of GDP.6 This 
has resulted in conventional and numerical superiority for Azerbaijan 
in the number of tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, Arty guns and the 
number of fighter jets.
There were many factors which led to the escalation of hostilities 
between the two countries and the war which ensued. The recent conflict 
had many triggers such as, when Prime Minister Pashinyan took over, he 
rejected the basic principles of the Minsk roup. Armenia adopted a new 
military doctrine and a movement supporting Artsakh becoming a part 
of Armenia took place in August 2019. This was followed by rejection of 
peace talks in March 2020 by Armenia. A military exercise was conducted 
with Russia by Armenia in July and early September 2020.7 Azerbaijan 
conducted a military exercise with Turkey in July-August 2020 and 
pro-war demonstrations erupted with Turkish support. Clashes erupted 
between both the countries on 27 September 2020 where even the civilian 
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areas were targeted. A two-prong offensive was launched by Azerbaijan, 
in which the Northern offensive was stalled but the Southern offensive 
made progress.8 The war ended up with Azerbaijan reclaiming the areas it 
had lost earlier securing its borders with Iran. It captured the important 
town of Susha while threatening Stephenkart and the strategic Lachin 
corridor. This was unacceptable to Armenia and at the behest of Russia it 
agreed to come on to the negotiating table for a ceasefire.
Fallout of the Conflict 
A ceasefire was signed between both the countries with Russia playing 
a major role in cessation of hostilities. The 2020 conflict helped Russia 
consolidate its own position in the geopolitics of the region by playing 
the role of peace broker and stationing more of Russian troops in the 
disputed region.9 Turkey backed Azerbaijan to the hilt in this conflict, 
which was in line with its own ambitions of playing a bigger role on the 
world stage and staking a claim for the leadership of the Muslim world. 
In the recent conflict, Azerbaijan not only reclaimed their lost 
territories but also decimated Armenian forces in a crushing defeat. 
Armenia agreed to return back all territories of Azerbaijan which it had 
captured earlier and provide a safe corridor (Meghri Corridor) along the 
border of Iran for connecting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Enclave with 
the mainland of Azerbaijan.10
The number of casualties suffered by Azerbaijan in terms of 
equipment were 1/7 of those suffe ed by Armenia. Heavy casualties were 
suffered by Armenian AD resources, mech columns and Arty guns due to 
drone attacks and targeting by long vectors.11 There was a public outcry 
in Armenia seeking the stepping down of Prime Minister Pashinyan. Even 
the speaker of the house was assaulted in Parliament. On the other hand, 
in Azerbaijan there was a victory parade taken out with  Turkish President 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan as its chief guest for the unstinted support in the 
conflict.12












Lessons to be Learnt from the Armenian Defeat
Important lessons which can be drawn, are as follows:
•	 The balance of power in the conflict shifted in favour of Azerbaijan 
because of their effective use of Turkish and Israeli drones, which 
destroyed the Armenian AD resources, mech columns and arty guns. 
The low-cost option of employment of drones by Azerbaijan in a 
non-contact yet highly kinetic warfare resulted in the minimising of 
their own casualties while ensuring a crushing defeat for Armenia.13
•	 Armenians made limited use of their Air Force and it was largely an 
uncontested airspace.
•	 There was no coordinated AD battle, the radars were unable to detect 
the small radio cross-section of the drones.
•	 Poor battle craft and fieldcraft, bunching of mechanised columns in 
a constricted battlespace with no camouflage, concealment and an 
absence of organic AD cover left them vulnerable.
•	 Poor training and non-tactical manoeuvres led to the vulnerabilities 
of the land units.
•	 Azerbaijan borrowed their concept of operations from Turkish 
operations during Operation Springshield in which they went for a 
systematic hunt of enemy AD, arty and mech columns.14
•	 Azerbaijan used old AN T2 surveillance aircraft as a bait to force the 
Armenian AD to open up and their radar signatures were picked up 
by the loiter ammunition in air and neutralised. 
•	 Azerbaijan did not respond to the missile attacks from Armenian soil 
as they did not want to force the hand of Russian Forces. Due to 
the CSTO agreement between Armenia and Russia, the latter was 
obliged to bail out Armenia in case of an attack.15   
•	 Azerbaijan ruled the battle of narratives by effective use of social 
media. It projected the conflict as a crusade between Christianity and 
Islam on European soil. The Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan kept 
releasing video footages of the devastation that their drone attacks 
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were inflicting on the Armenian positions which demoralised the 
frontline Armenian soldiers and led to their unsystematic withdrawal. 
Why Azerbaijan Won—Factors at Play
Use of Drones
Two drones were extensively used by Azerbaijani forces. The Turkish 
unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), Bayraktar drones is a Medium 
Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone, flies to heights of up to 27,000 
feet and has endurance of 27 hours. It carries a payload of 150 kg of 
precision-guided and laser smart ammunition. The second, was the Harop 
drones, manufactured by the Israeli Aerospace Industries. They are the 
Kamikaze or suicide drones which are also called loiter ammunition. They 
have a very small radar cross-section and are anti-radiation drones which 
destroy enemy radars. 
Israel also supplied Azerbaijan with Skystriker and Orbiter 1K suicide 
drones. Armenian AD was subjected to a duck shoot scenario. Vintage 
equipment, incompetent handling, no anti-drone measures resulted in 
destruction of even the lethal S-300 system. Use of loiter ammunition keep 
tracking, lock-on and neutralise the targets without any other collateral 
damage was highly effective and also conserved precious manpower.16
Geo-Politics and Power Play
The dynamics of the relations between various countries, as well as, the 
ongoing global politics also impacted the fate of the conflict. They are: 
•	 Azerbaijan maintained good relations with both Russia and Turkey. 
Russia was supplying arms and military equipment to both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Pashinyan, tried to wean away from 
the strategic relationship Armenia enjoyed with Russia and woo the 
Western powers. These changes in foreign policy did not go down 
well with Kremlin. During this conflict, Russia did not come to the 












rescue of its old ally Armenia taking the plea that it did not have 
any obligations under the CSTO agreement as the conflict was not 
on Armenian soil. In October end, when Russia did interfere, it was 
because it wanted to check the growing influence and dominant role 
being played by Turkey in the conflict, reassert and strengthen its 
own position in the region. It deployed it’s Karsukha-4 EW system 
to bring down the Azerbaijani drones and send a strong message. 
Russian deployment of 2000 peacekeeping forces has further granted 
them a foothold in this region.17
•	 The military operations began and ended during the peak of US 
elections and while there was domestic turmoil in France which was 
heading the chairmanship of OSCE. NATO was also not able to 
keep Turkey under check, which has been displaying very aggressive 
foreign policies.
•	 OSCE was powerless to bring about a peaceful negotiation. Peace 
finally was brought about as a consequence of negotiations done after 
the war.
•	 Armenian suffered a humiliating defeat and loss of territory which 
did not go down well with the local population.
•	 This conflict also highlighted the rise of authoritarian regimes in 
Azerbaijan and Turkey with a nationalist fervour.18
•	 Turkey has been following very aggressive foreign policies on the 
world stage in a bid to stake claim as a leader of the Ummah or the 
Muslim world.
•	 All stakeholders were finally just trying to further their own national 
interests and no one was really interested in finding a lasting and 
peaceful resolution to the issue.
Implications For India
There are numerous implications which can be drawn out from this 
conflict, which are as follows:
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•	 The use of emerging, disruptive technologies can shift the balance of 
power in a short duration war.
•	 The growing nexus between Azerbaijan-Turkey-Pakistan-China,19 
needs to be factored in India’s security calculus and therefore, there 
is a need to counter this nexus. Azerbaijan and Turkey have also 
been voting against India in many UN resolutions especially those 
concerning J&K and in support of  Pakistan.
•	 This hostile alignment of forces also threatens India’s International 
North South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—an over 7200 km length 
corridor that provides India, trade connectivity with Central Europe 
over a multi-mode network of transports.
•	 It also has implications for our energy security and for safeguarding 
our strategic energy assets. ONGC Videsh has made an investment 
of 1 billion USD in Azeri-Chiag-Gunashali (ACG) and Baku-Tiblis-
Ceyhan (BTC) oilfields.20
•	 There is growing Chinese influence in South Caucasus, by means 
of financing developmental projects in the region. The Meghri safe 
corridor agreed to be provided by Armenia as part of a ceasefire 
agreement to connect Azerbaijan mainland with its autonomous 
enclave could also provide an alternative route for China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative project which bypasses Iran.
•	 China is making huge investments in R&D for drone and counter-
drone technologies. There is a growing nexus and cooperation 
between Pakistan-China-Turkey in these fields.
•	 Armenia and Azerbaijan have also become dialogue partners in 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
•	 India had inked a contract to sell Swathi Weapon Locating Radar, 
made by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Defence Research 
and Development Organisation (DRDO) to Armenia in 2020. The 
supply could have been expedited as there is no greater sales pitch 
than having one’s equipment validated for its efficacy in a live conflict, 












especially keeping in view India’s growing ambitions of being seen as 
an important and credible arms exporter.21
•	 The battle of attrition solely based on conventional, numerical 
superiority may no longer be as decisive with the advent of newer 
domains of warfare being embraced. India’s modernisation plans 
have to be pragmatic, accompanied by changes in our doctrines 
and strategies. A recent example of this can be seen in the adoption 
of the new Overall Defence Concept by Taiwan in building up of 
asymmetric defences against a stronger adversary.22
•	 It also needs to be ensured that the conventional combat capabilities 
remain effective in face of use of disruptive technologies and the rapid 
technological shifts.
•	 Need for building of anti-access bubbles as deterrence which are 
difficult to penetrate and use of technologies which allow us to 
leverage this competitive space.
•	 Swarm drone attacks can be a game-changer in saturating the enemy’s 
AD resources. India needs to develop indigenous counter-drone 
technologies to safeguard its assets. Civil-Military fusion along with 
synergy in efforts with the public sector undertakings would be essential 
in development of these technologies.
•	 There is a need to institute mechanisms to ensure an effective media 
management to win the battle of narratives so aptly demonstrated by 
Azerbaijan.
•	 Use of Syrian mercenaries23 and n n-state actors who came via Turkey 
to participate in the warfighting alongside Azerbaijan military is also 
an issue of concern and needs to be factored in our security calculus.
•	 Importance of fieldcraft and use of camouflage and concealment 
cannot be overemphasised. The relevance of traditional warfighting 
capabilities cannot be understated. It is not the question of 
development of these or the newer emerging technologies but 
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the concurrent, judicious development of both with jointness of 
operations and greater synergy.
•	 Use of UCAV in the network-centric future battlefield is going to be an 
important element, as is the case with all other disruptive technologies 
being embraced. Pakistan and China are actively employing these 
in their operational tasks. The efficacy or effect of the use of armed 
drones may not be as devastating as it was in Armenia-Azerbaijan 
conflict in the context of our sub-continent because neither will the 
battlespace be so constricted nor the air space so permissive, there 
will also be a heavy AD cover, counter-drone technologies and a very 
effective Air Force. Though, the use of drones for surveillance of 
border areas, smuggling of arms and ammunition, drugs, terrorist 
attacks and limited targeting of important military and civilian 
installations will definitely need to be factored in our operations.
Recommendations for India
Recommendations for the course of action for India from this conflict are 
as follows: 
•	 India must continue to strengthen its bilateral ties with both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan in sync with its national strategic interests. 
•	 India needs to go in for a sensible modernisation of forces giving due 
thought to force structure, its application and protection.
•	 Strategic military future with enhanced threats and shrinking defence 
budgets would need technology as a central pillar for improving our 
combat worthiness.
•	 India needs to build a transformative, digital era military with speed 
and scale which draws imagination and innovation into the combat.
•	 War games must factor in drone attacks, use of emerging technologies, 
aspects of perception management and building of own narratives 
effectively.













As India embarks on the modernisation of its Armed Forces in sync 
with its aspirations of playing a greater role at the world stage, it must 
safeguard its own national interests. The role of disruptive emerging 
technologies needs to be factored in our strategic security calculus and 
changes incorporated for faster procurement procedures and building 
an eco-system for self-reliance. There is a need for greater civil-military 
fusion in order to modernise the armed forces at the desired pace. India 
is purposefully moving in this direction with a time-bound roadmap to 
achieve a technology-enabled force with many indigenous drone and 
counter-drone projects by DRDO, HAL and some stellar work by civilian 
firms in pipeline. 
Modifications need to be made in the war doctrines and strategies in 
order to embrace the newer domains of warfare along with the acquisitions 
of traditional warfighting platforms which will always remain relevant in the 
operations for holding, denying and occupying territories. The mech tactics 
need to be integrated with the new realities to remain relevant and effective 
in future operations with an organic AD cover. The AD resources need 
to have counter-drone technologies to detect, and neutralise the drone 
attacks. Counter drone systems should consist of multiple weapon systems 
including short-range weapons with a fast rate of fire, effective electronic 
warfare systems, direct energy weapons, hunting drone technologies, 
electromagnetic pulse systems and incorporating the new developments 
in magnetic shield systems. This military campaign does provide a good 
understanding of the changing character of warfare and the accompanied 
changes which need to be brought about in our warfighting capabilities.
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